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Abstract: The Foreign Exchange Global Code comes to the fore against a backdrop of ethical 
drift, which has affected the Foreign Exchange markets of late. In précising recent market scandals, 
this article shall outline why the Global Code is needed, before assessing the drafts which emerged 
out of the Code’s first and second developmental phases in May 2016 and May 2017 respectively. 
Under particular scrutiny will be their substantive content, the parties which contributed to their 
drafting, and the strategies being proposed for the Code’s implementation. 
 
 
Keywords: Financial Markets; Transnational Economic Governance; Financial Regulation; 
Networked Governance; Foreign Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction  
Beset by a state of what has been referred to as "ethical drift", which has encouraged profit-
maximisation at the expense of moral considerations to the contrary,1 the foreign exchange (FX) 
market has occasionally been subject to scandalous activity of late. It is hardly surprising therefore 
that the Bank of International Settlements’ announcement of a "Foreign Exchange Global Code" 
has been welcomed by industry players—the first phase of which came to fruition in May 2016,2 
followed by the second (and final) phase in May 2017.3  
Pioneered by the Foreign Exchange Working Group (FXWG), whose work is informed by a set 
of member institutions and also a group of market participants, the Code is stated to be a "common 
set of guidelines to promote the integrity and effective functioning of the wholesale foreign 
exchange market".4 Semantic implementation of the word "guidelines" here is rather apt since 
FXWG chairman Guy Debelle is adamant that "[t]he Code will be principles-based—rather than 
rules-based—and will provide guidance on what is, as well as what is not, appropriate behaviour 
for practitioners in the FX market".5 The reasoning behind this is simple: the Code’s aim of 
affirming best practice norms within the culture of applicable entities is distinctly holistic and thus 
is hardly something which can be enforced or mandated by hard-law.6  
                                                 
1
 Bank of England, "Rebuilding Trust through the ‘FX Global Code’: Reasons for optimism", Speech given by 
Chris Salmon, ACI UK Square Mile Debate (London: 21 September 2016), p.2 available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech924.pdf [Accessed 31 May 
2017]. 
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3
 Global Foreign Exchange Committee (GFXC), FX Global Code (May 2017) available at: 
http://www.globalfxc.org/docs/fx_global.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
4
 Bank for International Settlements, FX Global Code: May 2016 Update (2016), p.2. 
5
 Bank for International Settlements, "Working group to strengthen code of conduct standards and principles in 
foreign exchange markets has commenced work", Press Release (24 July 2015) available at: 
http://www.bis.org/press/p150724.htm [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
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 Chatsworth communications, "BIS FX Code of Conduct Offers Reasons for Optimism" (26 September 2016) 
available at: http://www.chatsworthcommunications.com/bis-fx-code-of-conduct-offers-reasons-for-optimism/ 
[Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
Procedurally, implementation of the Code in a certain jurisdiction shall "take account of"7 the 
applicable law operable there since it is "intended to serve as a supplement to any and all local laws, 
rules, and regulation"8 as opposed to supplanting them outright. The Code will operate on a soft-
law echelon clearly delineable from the ratio decidendi, tasked instead with harmonising the 
preponderance of regional FX codes littering the industry at present, thus facilitating "a 
harmonised set of best practices that can be applied internationally".9 
At ground level, the Code shall provide a yardstick by which a participant can "review the adequacy 
and completeness of … [its] current internal compliance materials related to the operation of its 
FX business".10 Compliance will be contingent upon the ability of said participant "to document a 
policy or procedure in furtherance of each of the Global Code’s principles".11 The rationale for 
the Code is thus undoubted in attempting to "encourage good practice and re-build public 
confidence"12 so that industry players "are able to confidently and effectively transact at 
competitive prices that reflect available market information".13 
 
 Nature of the foreign exchange market  
Prior to embarking upon substantive exploration of the Code itself, it will be fruitful to first 
ascertain the significance and nuances of the market upon which it is based. The FX market as we 
know it today is the culmination of various international monetary policy reforms dating back to 
                                                 
7
 GFXC, FX Global Code (2017), p.5. 
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 Bank for International Settlements, FX Global Code: May 2016 Update (2016), p.2. 
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 Euromoney, "FX: Restoring trust—the global code is here" (July 2016) available at: 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3512558/FX-Restoring-trustthe-global-code-is-here.html [Accessed 31 May 
2017]. 
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 Bank for International Settlements, FX Global Code: May 2016 Update (2016), p.2. 
the mid-20th century. July 1944 saw the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference, a 
forum for Allied representatives to convene in order to discuss post-war monetary issues. Reforms 
arising out of the Conference included the fact that foreign currencies would subsequently be 
pegged to the US dollar and that the value of the dollar would in turn be contingent upon the price 
of gold. These proved to be unsustainable, however, as it soon became "impossible for individual 
countries to manage the value of their own currency"14 since the dollar was itself succumbing to 
the volatility of gold prices. For example, sharp rises in the price of gold during the early 1970s 
were proving problematic for US inflation levels.15 This, in turn, led to President Richard Nixon 
removing the stranglehold which gold prices had on the price of the US dollar, paving the way for 
currencies to float at market rates.16 Combined with Britain’s abolition on FX controls in 1979,17 
policy actions such as this facilitated the conception of the FX market as we now know it. 
 
The foreign exchange market today 
The FX market has remained a stalwart of global finance. Boasting business volumes of an 
estimated $5 trillion per day,18 movements in exchange rates resulting from FX activity are of 
sufficient magnitude to impact upon inflation, the balance of trade19 and also the vitality of 
businesses on the ground. Constituting more than a third of the FX market’s aggregate volume is 
                                                 
14
 OANDA, "Evolution of an Open Forex Market" available at: https://www.oanda.com/forex-
trading/learn/intro-to-currency-trading/currency-market/evolution [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
15
 OANDA, "Forex Training Summary" available at: https://www.oanda.com/forex-trading/learn/intro-to-
currency-trading/currency-market/summary [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
16
 J. Markham, "Regulating the Moneychangers" (2016) 18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 
789, 807. 
17
 K. Lander and R. Preece, "Finance briefing: Foreign exchange market and why it matters" (6 April 2014), 
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31 May 2017]. 
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 Bank for International Settlements, "Triennial Central Bank Survey of foreign exchange and OTC derivatives 
markets in 2016" (Statistics, 11 December 2016) available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16.htm [Accessed 31 
May 2017]. 
19
 D. Zaky, "Forex Market Participants and Why They Trade Currencies" (24 October 2016), Fxdailyreport.com, 
Education available at: http://fxdailyreport.com/who-trades-forex-currency/ [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
the UK,20 with its Joint Standing Committee announcing FX turnover of over $2.2 billion in April 
2016 alone.21 Another FX stronghold is the US, with almost 90% of daily trading volumes in 2013 
said to comprise dollar trades,22 whilst the remainder of the market is made up of countries 
including Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong.23  
With specific regard to how such trades are facilitated, the FX market "performs an international 
clearing function by bringing two parties wishing to trade currencies at agreeable exchange rates".24 
This is logistically possible by virtue of the fact that parties need not meet in person; instead, 
transactions are undertaken over the telephone or by electronic means. In terms of overall 
structure, the FX market is double-faceted. For one, some of its characteristics are customary of 
perfect competition, such as its outputs which are homogeneous.25 Secondly, although 
WM/Reuters provides the market with daily benchmark rates known as "fixes",26 the final price 
of a FX transaction is arrived at following negotiations between the parties themselves27 —with 
the market working to move the benchmark rate toward an agreed equilibrium. That said, however, 
also latent amongst market players are heterogeneous deviations, "including informational 
asymmetries, differing reaction speeds to information innovations, and diverse opportunity sets 
and risk-return expectations".28  The presence of these deviations renders the FX market somewhat 
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 Financial Conduct Authority, "Conduct risk in FX markets", Speech by Edwin Schooling Latter, Head of 
Markets Policy (London: FX Week Europe, 30 November 2016) available at: 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/conduct-risk-fx-markets [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
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 The Foreign Exchange Joint Standing Committee, Results of the Semi-Annual FX Turnover Survey in April 
2016 (April 2016) available at: 
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 Iowa State University, "Foreign Exchange Market" available at: 
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/fex.htm [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
23
 Iowa State University, "Foreign Exchange Market". 
24
 Iowa State University, "Foreign Exchange Market". 
25
 N. Elrick, "Perfect Competition", p.2 available at: https://business-
tes.wikispaces.com/file/view/Perfect+Competition+notes.pdf [Accessed 6 July 2017]. 
26
 Thomson Reuters, "WM/Reuters FX Benchmarks; Spot & Forward Rates Methodology Guide", Document 
Version 2 (January 2017) available at: 
http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/financial/wm-reuters-
methodology.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
27
 N. Elrick, "Perfect Competition" available at: https://business-
tes.wikispaces.com/file/view/Perfect+Competition+notes.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
28
 M.J. Sager and M.P. Taylor, "Under the Microscope: The Structure of the Foreign Exchange Market" [2006] 
International Journal of Finance and Economics 11, 81. 
imperfectly competitive. Despite this, however, FX transactions have remained popular because 
of the returns to be gleaned from them both as standalone investments and "when combined in a 
portfolio with returns to more traditional assets, such as equities or bonds".29 
Market participants 
As for the people and institutions involved in FX trades, Pt II of the Code’s Foreword exhaustively 
lists participants generally expected to be engaged in such activities; participants who in turn fall 
within the ambit of the Code. Listed first are financial institutions. An umbrella term predominated 
by banks, these are active in the FX market as both market makers for clients and as clients in their 
own right. Banks bring together buyers and sellers of a certain currency, acting as dealers aiming 
to make a profit on the bid-offer price spread.30 In addition, banks undertake their own speculative 
trading exploits, the aim of which is to profit from changes in exchange rates.31 Furthermore, a 
preponderance of bank-to-bank FX trading since the collapse of Bretton Woods32 has led to an 
interbank FX sub-market. "[R]esponsible for the exchange rates which all other traders follow on 
their quote systems and trading platforms",33 these banks "make currency transactions with each 
other on electronic brokering systems that are based on credit".34 Taken together, banks therefore 
herald a multi-faceted interest in FX dealing. 
The second organisation type listed on the Code’s market participants list are central banks. Their 
engagement with FX is solely as a vehicle by which to increase or maintain the vitality of a currency. 
A central bank can artificially weaken its domestic currency by first increasing its supply, before 
using it to stockhold quantities of a foreign currency. Through making exports more desirable, the 
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 Sager and Taylor, "Under the microscope" [2006] International Journal of Finance and Economics 11, 82. 
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 Zaky, "Forex Market Participants and Why They Trade Currencies" (2016), Fxdailyreport.com, Education. 
31
 Zaky, "Forex Market Participants and Why They Trade Currencies" (2016), Fxdailyreport.com, Education. 
32
 Markham, "Regulating the Moneychangers" (2016) 18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 
789, 808. 
33
 Forextraders, "Forex Market Participants" (6 November 2016) available at: 
https://www.forextraders.com/forex-education/forex-fundamental-analysis/forex-market-participants/ [Accessed 
31 May 2017]. 
34
 Investopedia, "Market Participants" available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/walkthrough/forex/beginner/level2/market-participants.aspx [Accessed 31 May 
2017]. 
resultant effect will be a weakening of its domestic value.35 Alternatively, were it to sell its foreign 
currency reserves in order to buy up quantities of its own currency, the consequential diminution 
in supply of the foreign currency will culminate in the maintenance of its value.36 These types of 
intervention by central banks are commonly referred to as "FX market interventionism". 
The third type mentioned within the Code’s exhaustive list of FX market participants are brokers. 
By pinpointing the most competitive buying and selling prices for specific currency pairings,37 
brokers act as intermediaries for exchanges of commodities, equities or foreign currencies. Whilst 
the brokerage industry is currently in a state of "electrolisation", with some in the City of London 
said to have "written off traditional voice-broking … [given a recent upsurge in] electronic 
trading",38 the aggregate popularity of brokers is ever increasing. 
Another significant participant in FX is asset managers. Generally tasked with "currency trading 
for large accounts like endowments and pension funds",39 their customers expect portfolio growth 
following successful engagement with the FX market, amongst others. A similar expectation is 
made of hedge fund managers, whose licence to invest in FX is often of a volume that can 
overwhelm even the monetary intervention of a central bank.40 Also falling within the Code’s 
itemisation of "asset managers" are sovereign wealth funds. Operating on the buy-side of the FX 
market, these funds are pools of “domestic assets owned and managed by governments to achieve 
a variety of economic and financial objectives—including the accumulation and management of 
reserve assets, the stabilisation of macroeconomic effects and the transfer of wealth across 
                                                 
35
 Zaky, "Forex Market Participants and Why They Trade Currencies" (2016), Fxdailyreport.com, Education. 
36
 Info All Search, "Market Participants in Foreign Exchange Markets" (Trading, 2011) available at: 
http://infoallsearch.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/main-participants-in-foreign-exchange.html [Accessed 17 January 
2017]. 
37
 Forextraders, "Forex Market Participants" (2016), Fxdailyreport.com, Education. 
38
 S. English, "Year of shocks leads to mega payouts for TP Icap brokers" (6 January 2017), Evening Standard 
available at: http://www.standard.co.uk/business/year-of-shocks-leads-to-mega-payouts-for-tp-icap-brokers-
a3434341.html [Accessed 17 January 2017]. 
39
 Zaky, "Forex Market Participants and Why They Trade Currencies" (2016), Fxdailyreport.com, Education. 
40
 CurrencyExchangeMarket, "Currency Exchange Market Participants" available at: 
http://www.currencyexchangemarket.net/role-currency-exchange-market-participants.html [Accessed 31 May 
2017]. 
generations".41 
The Code also lists persons which, whilst engaged in foreign currency exchanges, would not be 
considered participants under the Code. The general retail public are an exemplar of this. Whilst 
the man on the Clapham omnibus looking to obtain three hundred Czech koruna for a stag 
weekend in Prague is, prima facie, engaging in a foreign currency exchange, his lay status is such 
that he will not succumb to the rigours of the Code. The same applies for money changers, 
presumably given that the FX transactions to which they are party involve a retail customer at the 
other end. 
Future of the foreign exchange market 
Whilst the FX Code applies to industry players included in its list of "market participants", it is 
crucial to remember that the Code fundamentally relies upon the existence of a flourishing FX 
market to which its guidelines can apply. It is notable, however, that FX market activity levels have 
plateaued since their heyday in 2014, during which volumes often reached $6 trillion per day.42 
Propelled by "tighter bank regulation, the fading emerging market boom and [most pertinently] a 
secular slowdown in world growth and trade",43 participants are increasingly being shut-out by 
"governments attempting to keep their domestic currencies weak in an attempt to export their way 
out of slow growth".44 Whilst this state interventionism might result in the artificial stimulation of 
cross-border trade, there are concerns emerging from the City of London that policy decisions 
such as these may affect the vitality of FX. Moreover, at a transactional level, unlawful engagement 
with the market has recently been occurring, by way of rigging and misconduct risk, to be explored 
below. 
                                                 
41
 F. Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 1st edn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), p.18. 
42
 A. Nag and J. McGeever, "Foreign exchange, the world’s biggest market, is shrinking" (11 February 2016), 
Reuters, Business News available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-fx-peaktrading-
idUSKCN0VK1UD [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
43
 Nag and McGeever, "Foreign exchange, the world’s biggest market, is shrinking" (2016), Reuters, Business 
News. 
44
 V. Cignarella, "The Foreign-Exchange Traders’ Lament" (24 April 2012), The Wall Street Journal available 
at: http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/04/24/the-foreign-exchange-traders-lament/ [Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
 Foreign exchange scandals  
The past few years have seen the emergence of "ethical drift"45 in the FX market (as referenced at 
the beginning of this piece), which has resulted in scandals besetting the industry in the past few 
years. Amongst other things, these included attempts to "manipulate or control fixes … 
deliberately triggering client stop loss orders … sharing confidential information with clients and 
traders at other firms"46 and also a practice known as "last look"—wherein a trader vetoed a client’s 
request to transact at a price that he had previously quoted. The aforementioned scandals will now 
be explored in turn. 
Manipulation of fix rates and benchmarks 
A post-mortem of the FX market found that banks engaged in a variety of practices aimed at 
manipulating fix rates, such as those set by WM/Reuters and the European Central Bank (ECB).47 
For instance, "traders in a chatroom with net orders in the opposite direction to the desired 
movement at the fix sought to transact before the fix with traders outside the chatroom".48 As a 
result, "[t]his maintained the volume of orders in the desired direction held by traders in the chat 
room",49 which in turn led to the avoidance of orders "being transacted in the opposite direction 
at the fix".50 Additionally, traders operating in the same chat room "with net orders in the same 
direction as the desired rate movement at the fix sought before the fix to … Net off these orders 
                                                 
45
 Bank of England, "Rebuilding Trust through the ‘FX Global Code’: Reasons for optimism", Speech given by 
Chris Salmon, ACI UK Square Mile Debate (London: 21 September 2016), p.2 available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech924.pdf [Accessed 7 July 
2017]. 
46
 Financial Conduct Authority, "Conduct Risk in FX markets", Speech by Edwin Schooling Latter, Head of 
Markets Policy (2016). 
47
 Markham, "Regulating the Moneychangers" (2016) 18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 
789, 824. 
48
 Claer Barrett and John Aglionby, "Traders’ forex chatroom banters exposed" (12 November 2014) available 
at: https://www.ft.com/content/47c32ec4-6a34-11e4-8fca-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e3 [Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
49
 Bank of England, Bank of England Foreign Exchange Market Investigation: A Report by Lord Grabiner QC 
(2014), p.11 available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2014/grabiner.pdf 
[Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
50
 Bank of England, Bank of England Foreign Exchange Market Investigation: A Report by Lord Grabiner QC 
(2014), p.11. 
with third parties outside the chat room, thereby reducing the volume of orders held by third 
parties that might otherwise be transacted at the fix in the opposite direction".51 
 This was colloquially referred to by those within chatrooms as "‘clearing the decks’ or ‘taking out 
the filth’".52 Another rigging practice was the so called "giving you the ammo".53 This involved the 
transfer of positions "to a single trader in the chat room, thereby consolidating orders in the hands 
of one trader".54 As a result, traders were essentially able to "affect market prices by submitting a 
rush of orders during the window when the fix is set".55 This elucidates the cultural failings and 
deficiencies at the concerned financial organisations. 
 
Triggering client stop-loss orders 
Clients have been known to place what are known as "stop-loss" orders with trading firms, in a 
bid to manage their foreign exchange exposure, by "stipulating the precise details of the order such 
as price, amount and duration, quantifying the maximum loss on any FX position or strategy in 
the market".56 In accepting these orders, "the [trading] firm agrees to transact with the client at or 
around a specified rate"57 —provided the currency does in fact trade at that specific rate on the 
open market.58 An agreement is contingent upon the "triggering" of the agreed rate—i.e. "when 
                                                 
51
 Financial Conduct Authority, "Final Notice to Barclays Bank Plc" (20 May 2015), p.20 available at: 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/barclays-bank-plc-may-15.pdf [Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
52
 M. Dakers, "How the forex trading scandal came to light" (13 November 2014) available at: 
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came-to-light.html [Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
53
 M. Levine, "Banks Manipulated Foreign Exchange in Ways You Can’t Teach" (12 November 2014), 
Bloomberg available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-11-12/banks-manipulated-foreign-
exchange-in-ways-you-can-t-teach [Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
54
 Bank of England, Bank of England Foreign Exchange Market Investigation: A Report by Lord Grabiner QC 
(2014), p.11 
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 S. Chrispin, "Forex scandal: How to rig the market" (20 May 2015), BBC News available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26526905 [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
56
 P. Golden, "FX: Brexit volatility triggers warnings on stop-loss orders" (16 June 2016), Euromoney available 
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orders [Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
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 Financial Conduct Authority, "Final Notice to Barclays Bank Plc" (2015), p.9. 
58
 Financial Conduct Authority, "Final Notice to Barclays Bank Plc" (2015), p.9. 
the currency trades at that rate in the market".59 Subsequently, this can result in a profit for the 
relevant trading outfit, for instance, "if the average rate at which the firm buys the currency in the 
market is lower than the rate at which it sells the currency to the client pursuant to the stop loss 
order".60 Furthermore, firms have been found to "manipulate the spot FX rate in order to execute 
stop loss orders for the firm’s benefit and to the potential detriment of its client".61 By way of 
example, a firm may transact in a bid to manipulate the spot rate, thus triggering the client’s order 
at the specified rate.62 This would result in the firm raking in an exponential profit, leaving the 
client financially worse off. 
"Last look" 
Another area of manipulation was the practice known as "last look", originally devised to protect 
banks from being bound to trade at what had become a historic price in fast-moving markets. This 
practice pertains to trading firms "advertising a price, but reserving the right, when a client asks to 
trade at that price, to reject the client’s order".63 This is also beneficial for the wider market, both 
in terms of price discovery and also in terms of accurate valuation for those who intend not to 
trade. It is for this reason that there are regulatory requirements in place in other financial markets, 
which stipulate that "prices advertised through the systems of a trading venue to be firm—ie 
executable—and pre-trade transparent".64 The abuse of the last-look practice in the FX spot 
market was an area of concern for regulators. Here, trading firms were found to have been 
asymmetrically65 refused orders deemed unprofitable after advertising a set price. For instance, 
                                                 
59
 Financial Conduct Authority, "Final Notice to Barclays Bank Plc" (2015), p.9. 
60
 Financial Conduct Authority, "Final Notice to UBS AG" (November 2014), p.9 available at: 
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63
 Financial Conduct Authority, "Conduct risk in FX markets", Speech by Edwin Schooling Latter, Head of 
Markets Policy (2016). 
64
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65
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Report (June 2015), p.31 available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf 
[Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
Barclays Bank was fined a hefty $150 million for rejecting transactions without explaining to clients 
who executed orders at the advertised price.66 In the words of the New York State Department 
for Financial Services:  "instead of employing Last Look as a purely defensive measure, Barclays 
instead used it as a general filter to reject customer orders that Barclays predicted, based on price 
movements during the hold period, would be unprofitable to the Bank".67 
 In sum, practices such as the aforementioned seemingly fractured trust at the helm of the FX 
market, thus leading to the emergence of the Code. 
 
 Birth and development of the Code  
As expressed above, scandalous activities in the FX market of late have hastened calls for 
appropriate regulatory responses. Since the third G20 Summit in September 2009, a plethora of 
these have come to pass—including the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)68 and 
the Dodd-Frank Act 2010,69 put forward to increase transparency in the derivatives market. 
However, without a normative substrate of "behavio[u]rs, practices, values & ethics"70 by which 
market participants are unified, the effectiveness of standalone statutory instruments and 
regulations is hugely inhibited. This lacuna in turn provided the rationale for the Code—a rationale 
which nestles snugly alongside global attempts at networked governance, such as the Financial 
Stability Board’s ongoing review of financial market benchmarks and subsequent attempts at 
reform.71  
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 Code development groups 
Originally announced by the Bank of International Settlements in mid-2015, the Code is set to be 
the product of a two-year collaboration between the public and private sectors,72 featuring 
contributions from central banks, and equally from Investment Management outfits and Banks. 
Central bank involvement comes in the form of the FXWG. Chaired by the Deputy Governor of 
the Reserve Bank of Australia, Guy Debelle, the group draws on the expertise of leading players 
in central banks including those of Australia, China, France, India, England and New York’s 
Federal Reserve, amongst others.73 In doing so, the FXWG aims to "facilitate the creation of the 
Global Code and to promote its adoption",74 thus indirectly encouraging the Financial Stability 
Board’s efforts at "cleaning-up" the FX industry.75  
Investment management and bank involvement in drafting the Code is made via the Market 
Participants Group (MPG), a unit "drawing on participants from the sell side and buy side of the 
market as well as FX infrastructure providers"76 —from Rolls-Royce and BlackRock to Deutsche 
Bank and JP Morgan. Chaired by David Puth, CEO of cash settlement system provider CLS, the 
MPG serves a double function; it provides substantive guidance on the drafting of the Code but 
also serves as a hub through which MPG members can filter relevant information gleaned first, 
from within their particular institution and secondly, from their nation’s FX committee (FXC).77  
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Phases of development 
As far as work on the Code goes, the task had been delineated into two phases. The first of these 
elapsed in May 2016. Led by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Head of Markets, Simon 
Potter, and with input from both the FXWG and the MPG, the first phase has brought together 
"common elements of the existing FX codes as well as drafting new principles for those areas not 
adequately covered in existing codes"78; existing FX codes which include those pioneered by the 
FXCs in Hong Kong, London and New York, amongst others.79 In sum, therefore, the first phase 
oversaw substantive draftsmanship of the Code. The second phase concluded in May 2017 and 
had a comparatively varied raison d’être, serving the following four functions. 
First, Phase 2 involved finding mechanisms which "promote and incentivise adherence"80 to the 
Code, which are outlined within an ancillary report.81 This report makes clear that market 
participants and central banks should lead the charge in the term of adherence, by setting out their 
intentions to adhere to the Code and placing an expectation on their regular trading counterparts 
that they do the same.82 Secondly, Phase 2 addressed FX practices that the 2015 Fair and Effective 
Markets Review83 deemed worthy of reform. By way of example, one such practice was that of "last-
look" retraction—as referred to extensively in the previous section, above. As "last look" is often 
perceived as being onerous to the client, some financial markets have provisions in place which 
oblige traders to operate transparently throughout the life of a trade.84 As a result, the FXWG and 
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MPG imported a similar obligation into the Code under Execution Principle 17.85 Thirdly, Phase 
2 entailed substantive completion of the Code’s Governance section and also its Risk Management 
and Compliance section, which were previously stated to be "in development"86 as per the Phase 
1 update released in May 2016. Finally, Phase 2 looked into electronic execution practices on FX 
trades,87 inviting suggestions as to how market participants operating FX e-trading platforms 
should conduct themselves.88  
 
 Overview of the Code  
As explained above, the Code is a laudable public–private partnership in transnational economic 
governance. It provides a "common set of guidelines to promote the integrity and proper 
functioning of the wholesale [FX] market".89 It also adopts a principles-based approach to 
governance and "does not impose legal or regulatory obligations on Market Participants nor does 
it substitute domestic regulation".90 The primary intent appears for it to be an essential reference 
for market participants and regulators, and will herein be examined on three grounds: its content, 
its negotiation and its implementation. 
Substantively, the Code appears to have been drafted on the basis of six broad-brush principles: 
ethics, governance, information sharing, execution, risk management and compliance, and 
confirmation and settlement processes. The Code’s breadth is then mitigated by more detailed 
guidance on each of the broad principles outlined above, thus revealing a trade-off between 
transferability and specificity. The Code is also accompanied by an annex containing examples 
"intended to help illustrate concepts drawn from the principles".91 This setup is not entirely 
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surprising given the diversity of participants in the FX market, as explained above. Thus, a set of 
specific "cafeteria" style principles would have risked a "one size fits all", meaning that the 
principles may lose their utility when applied in disparate settings. The core elements of 
responsibility and accountability permeate the Code. These appear to want participants to 
strengthen their internal practices, thus increasing compliance and good behaviour in the wholesale 
FX market—corresponding with Iris Chiu’s seminal idea of regulating from the inside.92 At the 
heart of the Code is a requirement for market participants to adhere to the highest standards of 
ethics and to act with honesty, fairness and integrity when dealing with clients and other market 
actors.93 Participants are also required to put in place sound and effective governance frameworks 
"to provide for clear responsibility and comprehensive oversight of their FX Market activity".94 
Except in limited circumstances, market participants are advised to refrain from disclosing 
confidential information and to communicate in a manner that is clear, accurate, professional and 
not misleading.95 This may mean an end to coarse and irreverent language in exclusive chat rooms. 
The aspects of the Code on execution are also welcome. Market participants are expected to 
exercise care when negotiating and executing transactions in order to promote a "robust, fair, open, 
liquid and appropriately transparent FX market".96 There is also a requirement for participants to 
improve their risk management practices and to put in place appropriate compliance and review 
systems to mitigate and manage the risks that may arise from a market participant’s activities in 
the FX market. The Code, however, makes clear that these systems may vary in scope and 
complexity given the disparate nature of participants in the wholesale FX market.97 The ideals of 
responsibility and accountability also permeate the principles on confirmation and settlement. 
Market participants are expected to put in place efficient, transparent, risk-mitigating post-trade 
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processes in order to promote the predictable, smooth and timely settlement of transactions in the 
FX market.98 Doing so does justice to the importance of a liquid and functional FX market, and 
mitigates the disruptions to trade settlement that illiquid FX markets might have for the real 
economy. In general, therefore, the Code represents a welcome development in transnational 
economic governance. It is now important to investigate its drafting and negotiation and the 
strategies put forward for its implementation. 
 
Drafting and negotiation 
As described above, the drafting and negotiation of the Code involved the public–private 
partnership of regulators and market participants. Whilst this approach is laudable, it does not 
mask lacunas nonetheless present within the drafting and negotiation process. First, there are 
significant concerns about the diversity of market participants and regulators involved in the 
drafting process. It appears that the market participant list was inordinately made up of the largest 
asset managers and banks, but market actors like sovereign wealth funds and pension funds (who 
operate on the buy side of the market) are conspicuously absent. There are also concerns about 
emerging market representation on the market participants list. The only emerging market 
participants appear to be representatives of large commercial institutions from China, Hong Kong 
and India. Chilean, Malaysian, Nigerian and Russian financial institutions are notably omitted, even 
though these countries are classed as emerging markets and also have properly functioning FX 
markets, as too is South Africa.99 Secondly, the regulators who negotiated the Code appear to have 
originated mostly from developed markets. In fact, the only emerging market regulatory 
representatives were the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the Reserve 
Bank of India, the Mexican Central Bank and its Brazilian counterpart. The Foreign Exchange sub-
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committee of the South African Reserve Bank appears to have been included, belatedly, during 
the formation of the new Global Foreign Exchange Committee (GFXC) which now oversees the 
Code.100 Also omitted was the Bahraini Central Bank, despite it overseeing the largest FX market 
in the Middle East.101 This calls into question the "global" character of the Code and raises 
significant issues of input legitimacy. A corollary of this might thus be fragmentation of the Code 
or its rejection in key emerging markets. 
 
Implementation 
On the question of implementation, the litmus test for the Code lies in how market actors will 
integrate it into their practices. Its non-prescriptive nature means that it does not impose legal or 
regulatory obligations on market participants. Compliance thus depends on the goodwill of market 
actors. For this reason, the FXWG has put forward certain measures to demonstrate commitment 
to the Code. These include the incorporation of the Code as a prerequisite for membership of 
private FX committees, the adoption of the Code as part of the admission process into financial 
markets infrastructures (such as electronic trading platforms and settlement systems) and a 
statement of commitment to be signed by market participants upon adherence to the code.102 
Other suggestions include the incorporation of elements of the Code into domestic regulatory 
structures such as the UK’s Senior Managers and Certification Regime.103 These integrity measures 
have their merit but also carry considerable risks. 
For one, the inclusion of the Code in the membership procedures of FXCs represents a less 
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adversarial approach to monitoring as opposed to top–down monitoring from public regulators. 
It enables FXCs to serve as gatekeepers in their various jurisdictions, keep the Code under review 
and develop strong lines of responsibility amongst members. There is, however, some 
circumspection about this approach. It seems likely that leaving the task of monitoring the Code 
to private actor-dominated FXCs might be perceived as unduly light-touch in approach. Former 
codes negotiated and agreed by FXCs tended to be voluntary and, in most cases, required 
remediation of a breach before the issue could be escalated to the FXC secretariat. By way of 
example, for counterparties who suspected an infraction of the UK’s 2011 Foreign Exchange Joint 
Standing Committee (FXJSC) Code, remedial action was only available with the trading partner, 
with issues of interpretation referable only to the FXJSC secretariat.104 Similarly, the 2012 Code of 
Conduct drafted and agreed by the Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee (SFEMC) 
urges market participants who suspect a breach of the Code to settle with the offending 
counterparty and to refer the matter to the secretariat of the SFEMC if no settlement is reached.105 
The same goes for the ACI Model Code where actors are required to go for an amicable settlement 
of any breach before escalating the matter to the ACI Committee for Professionalism.106 The 
danger of a remediation approach is that it fails to cater for situations where market parties may 
be engaging in collusive misconduct—a practice starkly elucidated by the FX misconduct scandal. 
If the Code is to be monitored by FXCs, then individual committees must devise stronger 
enforcement strategies, on the basis that former codes seemingly had no robust record of 
enforcement. Appropriate strategies might include higher reporting of compliance to the FXC 
secretariat and tougher sanctions, including the escalation of serious cases to the appropriate 
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regulator, pecuniary sanctions and, in extreme cases, the withdrawal of membership. Another 
option put forward by the FXWG is the adoption of the Code as a prerequisite for admission on 
financial market infrastructures, such as trading venues and settlement systems.107 This is not 
without precedent. Market infrastructure providers like the London Stock Exchange (LSE) already 
publish rules which corporations must adhere to if they are to be admitted or listed on exchange 
platforms and trading venues.108 These standards are backed by robust sanctions including fines 
and suspensions from the facility.109 Given that market infrastructure providers have been co-
opted into the drafting and negotiation process, incorporating the Code into their membership 
criteria would be seamless. The difficulty, however, lies in the policing aspect. Many of these 
infrastructure providers profit from the execution and settlement of trades of their platforms. In 
fact, the biggest FX market players are shareholders of CLS international.110 This could erect strong 
conflicts of interest and lead to weak enforcement, thus damaging the utility of the Code. 
The FXWG has also developed a readily accessible Statement of Commitment,111 which market 
participants can use to publicly demonstrate commitment to the Code and to support key 
objectives of the Code, such as enhancing transparency, efficiency and functioning in the FX 
market. The FXWG believes that the public use of this document will generate a network effect 
and thus promote compliance.112 To strengthen this attestation system, the MPG of the FXWG is 
developing public registers where firms can demonstrate their use of the aforementioned 
Statement of Commitment.113 Work on this register is still in development with a number of 
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possible options under consideration, including the establishment of a link between registers for 
ease of reference by interested parties, such as prospective counterparties and clients.114  
Another monitoring system under consideration, especially in the domestic regulatory arena, is the 
incorporation of elements of the Code into regulatory structures like the UK’s Senior Managers 
and Certification Regime.115 This will undoubtedly provide a binding effect by holding relevant 
authorised persons such as senior managers responsible for future FX misconduct, but it is not 
without its perils. It may also stifle experimentation and novel techniques in what is an otherwise 
roving and dynamic market, and also risk holding senior managers to account for the actions of 
traders who may have been acting on their own accord. Furthermore, the adoption of the Code in 
domestic regulatory frameworks may produce a paradoxical effect—a regulatory race to the 
bottom where certain jurisdictions lower the application of the Code or neuter it in the competition 
for market share. This in turn could lead to the unravelling of the Code and possible fragmentation. 
Note, in particular, the decision of Chinese regulators to explore the possibility of a "Chinese" 
version of the Code for local and foreign banks operating in the Chinese onshore market.116 A 
diminution of the Code to suit Chinese banks and FX operators may lead to greater regulatory 
arbitrage, in which trading firms capitalise on such low standards in a bid to circumvent the more 
robust domestic frameworks of other FX markets. 
On the basis that the Code is now complete and has been unveiled, the focus will rightly move to 
how market participants embed it into their institutional practices. Whilst it provides practical 
guidance on ethics, information sharing, governance, risk management, execution and settlement, 
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the Code’s litmus test will thus be the ability of market participants and regulators to demonstrate 
their commitment to it, through robust implementation and monitoring. 
 
 Concluding remarks  
The Code looks set to be the first step in a much-needed clean-up project of the financial markets, 
providing the catalyst for a new wave of cross-border economic governance in the process. Whilst 
this overarching aim is clear, what remains to be seen is whether concerns about the diversity of 
market participants involved in the drafting process, and also concerns about implementation and 
adherence, will scupper attempts to achieve its aim. Ultimately, this will only fully become clear 
once the dust raised by the Code’s unveiling has settled. 
 
